Chapter The "Troubles" of Irish Politics - Study Guide by History

SDLP and Sinn Fein candidates declined to take their seats in the new Assembly, in accordance with the policy of Abstentionism. Hopes in 1981 had been shattered by 1982 with the return to disillusionment.

Sectarian violence entered a new phase in the early 1980s with more audacious IRA attacks on the mainland - e.g. the London Campaign of 1982 (notably with the Hyde Park atrocity) and the bombing of the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton in 1984. The government responded by stepping up counter-insurgency measures and reinforcing the Prevention of Terrorism Act. There were also attempts to "gag" the IRA and Sinn Fein with a ban on television and press coverage. The accusations against the alleged 'shoot and kill' policy of the security forces in Northern Ireland exacerbated tensions.

In a climate of mutual suspicion, hatred and violence the government launched another strategy in 1983, the New Irish Forum. Also a further Inter-Governmental summit was convened but made little progress except the realisation that the "power-sharing" idea (i.e. between Protestants and Catholics) was unacceptable and an alternative form of joint control would have to be found. The Brighton bombing of 1984 served as a clear reminder that there were sections of opinion that did not approve of the government's attempts at forging new departures.

In 1985 at third IGC in Belfast important developments were made beneath the surface, even though at the time it seemed to have failed. Considerable thought had been put into place that would be important in breaking through the stalemate in Northern Ireland and revealed politicians and officials receptive to some changes that could be built upon in future meetings. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 had three principal objectives - the Republic's recognition of Northern Ireland's constitutional position while at the same time acknowledging the Nationalists' aspirations for a unified Ireland; convincing Nationalists there could be a future in commitment to judicial and political institutions in Northern Ireland; and developing cross-border initiatives and co-operation. Both sides committed themselves to the devolution of Northern Ireland, the British government on the understanding that it would remain part of the United Kingdom. Some Unionists were outraged and condemned the Agreement as a betrayal and an underhanded back- door attempt to prepare for Irish unification.

Although Mrs Thatcher was disappointed with the Agreement and IGC as they had failed to fulfil her immediate objective of bringing an end to violence and terrorism, the events of 1985 were an important 'stepping stone' to the breakthrough in 1993, the Downing Street Declaration. However, closer to the times Thatcher's fears were confirmed with the Remembrance Day incident at Enniskillen in 1987. Worse came in 1988 at the funeral of three alleged IRA members shot by British security forces in Gibraltar when gunfire interrupted the service killing 3 and injuring 68. At the funeral of some of the mourners the IRA retaliated by kidnapping two British soldiers and murdering them in front of television film crews recording for the British public. Thatcher responded with a complete reporting ban on Sinn Fein, in what she described as a policy designed to deny the organisation the 'oxygen of publicity'. The IRA was swift to retaliate, with attacks on military bases in London and County Tyrone.

The most important of Thatcher's last moves as Prime Minister in Irish policy came with the appointment of Peter Brooke as Secretary of State in 1989 during a Cabinet reshuffle. Brooke was delegated to bring the disparate groups in Northern Ireland at the conference table, which seemed to have slim chance of success with the IRA bombing of the Royal Marines' School of Music in September 1989 (in which 10 were killed) and the car- bombing assassination of Thatcher's political ally Ian Gow.

Thatcher was out of government within months. Retrospectively some have believed this allowed a measure of progress in negotiations as during the long period of Thatcher's reign over Number 10 she built up a persona that was odious to the IRA and Sinn Fein. However the arrival of John Major as Prime Minister hardly marked a turning point in the Irish Question - in 1991 the IRA launched a rocket attack on Downing Street during a Cabinet meeting. However Peter Brooke's talks were under way by this stage, their strategy being to gradually involve the main parties, the Irish government and concentrate on establishing a working relationship between the British and Irish governments. As the discussions progressed they were hampered