Chapter The "Troubles" of Irish Politics - Study Guide by History

by boycotts and walkouts by various parties, but suggested the form of broad-based inter-governmental negotiations and initiatives that would be needed to make a breakthrough in providing a solution.

1992 saw the 3,000th death of the Troubles and the collapse of the new Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew's efforts to bring an end to the stalemate. It was apparent that a leap or burst of momentum would be needed to prevent peace initiatives stalling as they had done so many times. The continuation of atrocities underlined the importance of bringing peace to Northern Ireland. A breakthrough came in the early 1990s with the realisation that the way forward might well be found in the opposite direction initiatives had been going - that is to include terrorist groups rather than marginalize them and focus on political and constitutionally-minded parties. The principle gained currency that if terrorism was addressed first and ceasefire or prolonged peace achieved talks could progress to more lasting and eventual political settlement.

For John Hume, the SDLP leader, the "leap" had come in 1985 when the British government stated it was 'neutral' on the issue of Northern Ireland's position in the United Kingdom. Hume believed that it was necessary for the British government to persuade Ulster Unionists of the possibility of devolution and unification in the future. Hume also debated with the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, about the possible impact continued terrorist activity might have in damaging the prospects of a future settlement or constructive approach. It was concluded that the IRA (or rather the cyclical sectarian violence in Northern Ireland as a whole) might destroy the objective of its activities - a unified Ireland entirely independent of British rule.

Hume's ideas achieved little currency during the 1980s but they did not disappear and in 1992 Sinn Fein published a document entitled Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland echoing some of Hume's ideas. The Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, initiated talks with John Major's government in which he unveiled his own proposals for progress in Ireland. After continued discussion these ideas became enshrined in the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 against a background of continued IRA violence on the mainland - the attack on the City of London in April 1993 killing one and causing £1 billion damage.

The Downing Street Declaration recognised the importance of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement but progressed beyond it in ways inconceivable in 1985. The British government reiterated its neutrality over Northern Ireland, repudiating accusations of selfish strategic or economic interest in maintaining strong political and constitutional links with the Province. The duty of Britain to defend Ulster was also reiterated, but this was accompanied by acceptance of the idea of a unified Ireland achieved by peaceful and democratic processes. Given the course of events in Ireland since 1969 the Downing Street Declaration was a remarkable breakthrough in Anglo-Irish diplomacy which held great promise for the future. However at the time many also pointed out that the most important step would be to bring an end to sectarian violence in the Province and on the British mainland. Lasting political settlement has eluded successive British Prime Ministers since the days of William Pitt in the eighteenth century, and since the 1960s the complexity of the Irish problem has in fact grown considerably.

It took until 1994 for the IRA to agree to a ceasefire, with the Loyalist paramilitary forces joining several months later. The broadcasting bans were lifted on Sinn Fein and the British government began to reduced its military presence in the Province and undertake other measures such as cutting down patrols and stipulating safety catches must be locked on weapons.

With both sides now committed to bringing an end to endemic violence, the test for the governments of Britain and Ireland was to transform a flimsy and fragile peace agreement into a productive political process working towards a lasting solution. The road ahead was fraught with obstacles, a primary obstruction being Unionist refusal to negotiate directly with Sinn Fein. However the real problem was with the issue of decommissioning arms. The IRA refused to hand over weapons, and this created a major obstacle to the participation of Sinn Fein in the all-party talks.