When Bonaparte, in February 1814, after gaining the battles at Etoges, Champ-Aubert, and Montmirail, left Blüucher’s army, and turning upon Schwartzenberg, beat his troops at Montereau and Mormant, everyone was filled with admiration, because Bonaparte, by thus throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent, then upon another, made a brilliant use of the mistakes which his adversaries had committed in dividing their forces. If these brilliant strokes in different directions failed to save him, it was generally considered to be no fault of his, at least. No one has yet asked the question; What would have been the result if, instead of turning from Blüucher upon Schwartzenberg, he had tried another blow at Blüucher, and pursued him to the Rhine? We are convinced that it would have completely changed the course of the campaign, and that the army of the allies, instead of marching to Paris, would have retired behind the Rhine. We do not ask others to share our conviction, but no one who understands the thing will doubt, at the mere mention of this alternative course, that it is one which should not be overlooked in criticism.

In this case the means of comparison lie much more on the surface than in the foregoing, but they have been equally overlooked, because one-sided views have prevailed, and there has been no freedom of judgement.

From the necessity of pointing out a better means which might have been used in place of those which are condemned has arisen the form of criticism almost exclusively in use, which contents itself with pointing out the better means without demonstrating in what the superiority consists. The consequence is that some are not convinced, that others start up and do the same thing, and that thus discussion arises which is without any fixed basis for the argument. Military literature abounds with matter of this sort.

The demonstration we require is always necessary when the superiority of the means propounded is not so evident as to leave no room for doubt, and it consists in the examination of each of the means on its own merits, and then of its comparison with the object desired. When once the thing is traced back to a simple truth, controversy must cease, or at all events a new result is obtained, whilst by the other plan the pros and cons go on for ever consuming each other.

Should we, for example, not rest content with assertion in the case before mentioned, and wish to prove that the persistent pursuit of Blüucher would have been more advantageous than the turning on Schwartzenberg, we should support the arguments on the following simple truths:

1 In general it is more advantageous to continue our blows in one and the same direction, because there is a loss of time in striking in different directions; and at a point where the moral power is already shaken by considerable losses there is the more reason to expect fresh successes, therefore in that way no part of the preponderance already gained is left idle.

2 Because Blüucher, although weaker than Schwartzenberg, was, on account of his enterprising spirit, the more important adversary; in him, therefore, lay the centre of attraction which drew the others along in the same direction.

3 Because the losses which Blüucher had sustained almost amounted to a defeat, which gave Bonaparte such a preponderance over him as to make his retreat to the Rhine almost certain, and at the same time no reserves of any consequence awaited him there.

4 Because there was no other result which would be so terrific in its aspects, would appear to the imagination in such gigantic proportions, an immense advantage in dealing with a staff so weak and irresolute as that of Schwartzenberg notoriously was at this time. What had happened to the Crown Prince of Wüurtemberg at Montereau, and to Court Wittgenstein at Mormant, Prince Schwartzenberg must have known well enough; but all the untoward events on Blüucher’s distant and separate line from the Marne to the Rhine would only reach him by the avalanche of rumour. The desperate movements which Bonaparte made upon Vitry at the end of March, to see what the allies would do if he threatened to turn them strategically, were evidently done on the principle of working on their fears; but it was done under far different circumstances,