The Use of the Battle

Whatever form the conduct of war may take in particular cases, and whatever we may have to admit in the sequel as necessary respecting it: we have only to refer to the conception of war to be convinced of what follows:

1 The destruction of the enemy’s military force is the leading principle of war, and for the whole chapter of positive action the direct way to the object.

2 This destruction of the enemy’s force must be principally effected by means of battle.

3 Only great and general battles can produce great results.

4 The results will be greatest when combats unite themselves in one great battle.

5 It is only in a great battle that the general-in-chief commands in person, and it is in the nature of things, that he should place more confidence in himself than in his subordinates.

From these truths a double law follows, the parts of which mutually support each other; namely, that the destruction of the enemy’s military force is to be sought for principally by great battles, and their results; and that the chief object of great battles must be the destruction of the enemy’s military force.

No doubt the annihilation-principle is to be found more or less in other means -- granted there are instances in which through favourable circumstances in a minor combat, the destruction of the enemy’s forces has been disproportionately great (Maxen), and on the other hand in a battle, the taking or holding a single post may be predominant in importance as an object -- but as a general rule it remains a paramount truth, that battles are only fought with a view to the destruction of the enemy’s army, and that this destruction can only be effected by their means.

The battle may therefore be regarded as war concentrated, as the centre of effort of the whole war or campaign. As the sun’s rays unite in the focus of the concave mirror in a perfect image, and in the fullness of their heat; so the forces and circumstances of war unite in a focus in the great battle for one concentrated utmost effort.

The very assemblage of forces in one great whole, which takes place more or less in all wars indicates an intention to strike a decisive blow with this whole, either voluntarily as assailant, or constrained by the opposite party as defender. When this great blow does not follow, then some modifying and retarding motives have attached themselves to the original motive of hostility, and have weakened, altered or completely checked the movement. But also, even in this condition of mutual inaction which has been the keynote in so many wars, the idea of a possible battle serves always for both parties as a point of direction, a distant focus in the construction of their plans. The more war is war in earnest, the more it is a venting of animosity and hostility, a mutual struggle to overpower, so much the more will all activities join deadly contest, and also the more prominent in importance becomes the battle.

In general, when the object aimed at is of a great and positive nature, one therefore in which the interests of the enemy are deeply concerned, the battle offers itself as the most natural means; it is, therefore, also the best as we shall show more plainly hereafter: and, as a rule, when it is evaded from aversion to the great decision, punishment follows.

The positive object belongs to the offensive, and therefore the battle is also more particularly his means. But without examining the conception of offensive and defensive more minutely here, we must still observe that, even for the defender in most cases, there is no other effectual means with which to meet the exigencies of his situation, to solve the problem presented to him.

The battle is the bloodiest way of solution. True, it is not merely reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is more a killing of the enemy’s courage than of the enemy’s soldiers, as we shall see more plainly in the