when vacancies occur. And also with a large number there is hope that all those who deserve to may enter. Even if some get in who are not suitable that is better than keeping out anyone who is well qualified. They should not hold absolute power over all public affairs, so as not to usurp too much authority, particularly in the matter of creating public officials, especially those with powers of punishment, either capital or for lighter offences, or those concerned with finances. They should not be permitted to make laws without the people's agreement so that they are able neither to change the form of the government nor to use the organisation of the city to the benefit of the powerful and oppression of the weak.

Their function must be to discuss and decide those matters where human prudence is most needed, that is, wars, peace, negotiations with princes, and all matters essential for the preservation and expansion of the state. The Spartans had optimates of this kind, drawn not from a special class of men but from the whole body of the city; the Romans had them, but differently, for with them the patricians were from the first the optimates and the rest formed the plebs, which was the origin of all their seditious movements.

One good thing about government by the people is that while it lasts there can be no tyranny. Laws are more powerful than men, and the proper end of all decisions is the safeguarding of universal well-being. The disadvantage is that the people, on account of their ignorance, are not capable of deciding matters of great importance, and so any republic which leaves the people to decide its affairs soon falls into decay. It is unstable and always looking for change, and yet easily deceived and misled by ambitious men and traitors. They are fond of persecuting well qualified citizens, for they need novelty and disturbances. To avoid these consequences one should not give the people power in any important matters, all except those which, were they in any other hands, would endanger freedom, such as the election of magistrates, the creation of laws. These should not come to the people until they have been well digested and approved by the supreme magistrates and the senate. However, the measures they put forward must not come into force until they are approved by the people. There should not be a free debate, for that is the principal instrument of sedition, but in the people's council only those who are invited by the magistrates to speak should do so, and only on the subject entrusted to them. By organising the state after this pattern you will obtain the balance described in the Discourse.